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ABSTRACT 
This paper assesses the impact of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP), the largest 
social protection program in Sub-Saharan Africa outside of South Africa. Using Propensity Score 
Matching techniques, we find that the program has little impact on participants on average, due in part 
to transfer levels that fell far below program targets. Beneficiary households that received at least half 
of the intended transfers experienced a significant improvement in food security by some measures. 
However, households with access to both the PSNP and packages of agricultural support were more 
likely to be food secure, to borrow for productive purposes, use improved agricultural technologies, 
and operate their own nonfarm business activities. For these households, there is no evidence of 
disincentive effects in terms of labor supply or private transfers. However, estimates show that 
beneficiaries did not experience faster asset growth as a result of the programs. 
Keywords: Productive Safety Net Programme, impact evaluation, food security, public 
works, Ethiopia    1
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Chronic food insecurity has been a defining feature of the poverty that has affected millions of 
Ethiopians for decades. The vast majority of these extraordinarily poor households live in rural areas 
that are heavily reliant on rainfed agriculture; thus, in years of poor rainfall, the threat of widespread 
starvation is high. Since the 1983-1984 famine, the policy response to this threat has been a series of ad 
hoc emergency appeals on a near annual basis for food aid and other forms of emergency assistance 
which are then delivered either as payment for public works or as a direct transfer. While these 
measures succeeded in averting mass starvation, especially among those with no assets, they did not 
banish the threat of further famine, nor did they prevent asset depletion by marginally poor households 
affected by adverse rainfall shocks. As a result, the number of individuals in need of emergency food 
assistance rose from approximately 2.1 million people in 1996 to 13.2 million in 2003 before falling 
back to 7.1 million in 2004 (World Bank, 2004). Further, the ad hoc nature of these responses meant 
that the provision of emergency assistance—often in the form of food-for-work programs—was not 
integrated into ongoing economic development activities (Subbarao and Smith, 2003).  
Starting in 2005, the Government of Ethiopia and a consortium of donors implemented a new 
response to chronic food insecurity in rural Ethiopia. Rather than annual appeals for assistance and ad 
hoc distribution programs, a three-year intervention called the Productive Safety Nets Programme 
(PSNP) was put into place. The objective of the PSNP is “… to provide transfers to the food insecure 
population in chronically food insecure woredas (districts) in a way that prevents asset depletion at the 
household level and creates assets at the community level” as well as bridging the food gap that arises 
when, for these households, food production and other sources of income are insufficient given food 
needs (Government of Ethiopia, 2004). The program operates as a safety net, targeting transfers to poor 
households in two ways—through public works (PW) and direct support (DS). Public works, the larger 
of the two programs, pays selected beneficiaries 6 Ethiopian birr per day (equivalent to approximately 
US$0.75)
1 for their labor on labor-intensive projects designed to build community assets. These 
activities are intended to occur between the months of January and June so as not to interfere with 
farming activities that in most regions occur in the second half of the year. Direct support, in the form 
of cash or food transfers, is provided to labor-scarce households, including those whose primary 
income earners are elderly or disabled, in order to maintain the safety net for the poorest households 
that cannot participate in public works. Depending on where they live, beneficiaries either receive cash 
or an equivalent payment in food, primarily wheat, maize and cooking oil. Beneficiaries are expected 
to remain in the PSNP for three years. 
The PSNP is complemented by a series of food security activities, collectively referred to as 
the Other Food Security Programme (OFSP). Beneficiaries of the OFSP receive at least one of several 
productivity-enhancing transfers or services, including access to credit, agricultural extension services, 
technology transfer (such as advice on food crop production, cash cropping, livestock production, and 
soil and water conservation), and irrigation and water harvesting schemes. While the PSNP is designed 
to protect existing assets and ensure a minimum level of food consumption, the OFSP is designed to 
encourage households to increase income generated from agricultural activities and to build up assets. 
The OFSP has more limited coverage. In the 2006 survey conducted for this study, 32.7 percent of 
households engaged in public works employment under the PSNP received OFSP transfers or services.  
Nearly all evaluations of social protection programs have centered on those in Latin America 
and, to a lesser extent, South Asia. Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa is much more limited; thus, it is 
of interest to examine the impact of a large-scale social protection program in an African setting. The 
PSNP reaches more than 7 million people and operates with an annual budget of nearly 500 million 
U.S. dollars. Outside of South Africa, it is currently the largest social protection program operating in 
                                                      
1 This was increased to 8 birr per day in 2008.   2
Sub-Saharan Africa. There are, however, additional features of the PSNP that make an assessment of 
this program especially interesting.  
Recent work has speculated that social protection programs may, in fact, be integral to policy 
frameworks that attempt to stimulate economic growth. In rural areas of Africa, there are pervasive 
credit and insurance market failures. This has two adverse consequences for agriculture: farmers are 
liquidity constrained (and therefore, for example, find it difficult to purchase fertilizer) and farmers are 
reluctant to take risks (for example, to adopt new crops). By providing liquidity and a reliable source of 
income, social protection addresses both types of market failures. Devereux (2008), Devereux et al. 
(2008), Dercon (2005), and Hoddinott (2008) provide further examples and references on this subject. 
An assessment of the PSNP offers insight as to whether these hypothesized benefits are realized in a 
large-scale program implemented in Africa.  
Using matching methods, this paper assesses the impact of PSNP. In particular, it looks at 
whether, after 18 months of operation, the PSNP—on its own or together with the OFSP—reduced 
household food insecurity; raised consumption levels; encouraged households to engage in production 
and investment through enhanced access to credit; increased use of modern farming techniques and 
entry into nonfarm own business activities; and contributed to sustained asset accumulation. It also 
investigates whether these programs have had disincentive effects, measured in terms of reduced 
participation in the wage labor market or in the crowding out of private transfers. As is explained 
below, because implementation of the PSNP deviated from what was originally planned, we used 
several definitions of program participation. Under one definition, a household is considered a 
treatment household if it received any payment for undertaking work on PSNP-supported public works. 
Under a second definition, a household is considered a treatment household if it received at least half 
of the amount of transfers it should have received according to the design of the program. Under the 
third definition, a household is considered a treatment household if it received any payment for 
undertaking work on PSNP-supported public works and received access to any component of the OFSP 
during this period.  
Using the first definition, we find little evidence of program impact. Under the second 
definition, access to the PSNP improves two measures of household food security: it reduces the 
likelihood that a household has very low caloric intake and it increases mean calorie availability. The 
largest impacts are found when we use the third definition of participation.  Relative to the comparison 
group, households with access to both the PSNP and OFSP are more likely to be food secure, and are 
more likely to borrow for productive purposes, use improved agricultural technologies, and operate 
nonfarm own business activities. There is no evidence of displacement or disincentive effects in terms 
of the reduced supply of labor to wage employment or private transfers. However, relative to the 
comparison group, these households did not experience faster asset growth. 
This paper begins by describing the data available to us and the methods used to assess impact. 
We then briefly review several aspects of the implementation of the PSNP, as these are relevant to the 
implementation and interpretation of our impact assessment, before we turn to the results themselves.  
   3
2.  SAMPLING METHODOLOGY, QUESTIONNAIRE, AND SURVEY 
IMPLEMENTATION 
We use a quantitative household and community survey fielded between late June and early August, 
2006, in the four principal regions served by the PSNP: Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region (SNNPR).
2 Within these regions, a sample of food-insecure 
woredas was selected in proportion to the overall number of chronically food-insecure woredas within 
that region and relative to the number of chronically food-insecure woredas in all four regions. Within 
each region, woredas were selected with probability proportional to size (PPS) based on the estimated 
chronically food insecure population (that is, the beneficiaries). The woredas were ordered 
geographically, in order to ensure geographical dispersion of the sample and to cover the range of 
agroecological conditions in each region. In total, 68 out of 190 woredas were selected. 
Within woredas, enumeration areas (EAs) where the PSNP was active were identified.
3  
Restricting the sample to EAs with active Productive Safety Net Programmes, two enumeration areas 
per woreda were chosen using PPS sampling for Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPR. In Tigray, three EAs 
per woreda were selected using PPS sampling. Twenty-five households were interviewed within each 
EA. Using separate lists of PSNP beneficiary and nonbeneficiary households, 15 PSNP beneficiary 
households and 10 nonbeneficiary households were selected for the sample using simple random 
sampling. This yielded a sample of 900 households each in Amhara and Tigray, and 950 households 
each in Oromiya and SNNPR, giving a sample size of 3,700.  
Three limitations of the survey should be noted. First, it would have been preferable to field a 
survey in 2005 prior to the implementation of the PSNP in addition to the one conducted in 2006, as 
this would have readily permitted a “before-after” and “with-without” evaluation design. In the 
absence of a pre-intervention survey, we included a wide range of retrospective questions about 
household size and composition, assets, prior experiences with emergency assistance, and selected 
food security outcomes such as the size of the food gap. These questions, phrased retrospectively about 
such characteristics two years prior to the survey (that is, six months before the PSNP began), make it 
possible to re-create pre-baseline conditions for beneficiary and nonbeneficiary households. While this 
approach partly resolves the absence of a pre-program survey, it represents a second best solution as it 
may be subject to recall biases.  A second limitation was that survey timing within the calendar year 
was good, but not ideal. The main agricultural season in Ethiopia runs from July to December, 
although there are regional variations within this period; for example, the season starts somewhat later 
in Tigray and Amhara. Given our survey’s timing, we have extensive information on participation in 
PSNP activities from January to May 2006 (as well as from June to December 2005), but we miss any 
activities that occur in June or July 2006. Finally, the public works component involved the 
construction of community assets, which may benefit both households employed in their construction 
and also those households not employed in public works. If those employed received greater (lesser) 
benefits from these community assets, measured differences in outcomes across these groups will be 
enhanced (attenuated). Unfortunately, our data do not permit a distinction between the income-transfer 
effects of the PSNP and the effects of the creation of these community assets. However, if households 
employed in public works and those not employed in public works obtain similar benefits from the 
community assets, then our estimates of the impact of participation in the program provide unbiased 
estimates of the income transfer effects. 
 
                                                      
2 Gilligan et al. (2007) provide a more detailed description of the survey. 
3 “Active” means that program administrative structures were in place, there existed a list of beneficiaries, and the PSNP 
had provided assistance for at least one month in the last 12 months.   4
3. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY  
Access to the PSNP was not randomized. Consequently, we use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to 
assess impact. This involves estimating a probit model that predicts the probability of each household 
receiving the PSNP as a function of (mostly pre-program) observed household and community 
characteristics using a sample of PSNP beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. The model specification is 
checked to test (and confirm) equality of the means of these observed characteristics across the 
beneficiary or “treatment” sample and the nonbeneficiary comparison group sample. In the impact 
estimates, the estimated probability of being in the program, or the “propensity score”, from this model 
is used to determine the closeness (the “match”) of treatment observations to neighboring 
nonbeneficiary comparison observations with similar values of the propensity score. The impact 
estimate is constructed as the average difference in the outcome of each beneficiary and a weighted 
average of nonbeneficiary outcomes, using the difference in propensity scores to construct the weights. 
Nonbeneficiaries with propensity scores nearest to the treatment observation receive the highest 
weight.
4,5,6      
PSM provides reliable estimates of program impact provided that (1) a comparable group of 
non-beneficiary households is available, and (2) there is access to carefully collected household survey 
data with many variables that are correlated with program participation and the outcome variables 
(Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997, 1998). The PSNP sample was designed to include an appropriate 
comparison group. The sample is drawn exclusively from woredas operating in the PSNP, and roughly 
one-third of the sample is made up of nonbeneficiary households living in the same communities as 
PSNP beneficiaries. Also, the PSNP survey includes a large set of variables affecting household 
welfare and program participation. These variables include measures of household head age, gender, 
and schooling; household size and other demographic characteristics; asset levels before the program, 
distance to markets, indicators of social networks, exposure to economic shocks in the two years before 
the PSNP, and controls for unobserved woreda-level effects.
7   
Our approach assumes that after controlling for all pre-program observable household and 
community characteristics that are correlated with program participation and the outcome variable, 
nonbeneficiaries have the same average outcome as beneficiaries would have had if they did not 
receive the program. PSM provides biased estimates of program impact if, for any chosen outcome, it 
is not feasible to control for enough observable characteristics so that this assumption holds. Having 
nonbeneficiary households from the same communities as PSNP beneficiaries helps to reduce the risks 
of such bias by providing a similar distribution of unobserved community characteristics, such as 
access to markets or local economic shocks. Also, where it was possible to gather information on 
outcome variables from before the start of the program, outcomes can be measured as average changes 
                                                      
4 The matching specification used is local linear matching with a tricube kernel using Stata’s psmatch2 command 
(Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). Standard errors of the impact estimates are estimated by bootstrap using 100 replications.   
5 To confirm that the impact estimates using PSM are robust to the estimation method, we also estimated impacts using 
nearest neighbor matching (NNM) following Abadie et al. (2004). Rather than relying on propensity scores, NNM is a form of 
covariate matching that uses a multidimensional metric of the distance between values of the observable characteristics to 
construct the weighted average difference in outcomes. Results based on NNM differed little from the PSM estimates and, in 
the interests of brevity, are not reported here. 
6 Note that if the program was perfectly targeted, and if resources were available to cover all eligible beneficiaries, this 
approach would not be feasible, as it would not be possible to construct a statistically robust comparison group. However, 
there is considerable evidence that suggests that because of resource constraints, program access was rationed with the result 
that not all eligible households participated (Sharp, Brown and Teshome, 2006). These poor nonbeneficiaries form the basis of 
our comparison group.   
7 A technical appendix, available from the authors upon request, provides a complete list of variables used in estimating 
the propensity score models. Controls for woreda-level fixed effects in the matching model have the effect of making 
nonbeneficiary households from the same woreda as a treatment household contribute more to the impact estimate. On 
average, nonbeneficiaries from the same woreda as a treatment household receive greater weight in the construction of the 
comparison group average outcomes as a result of the use of woreda-level dummy variables.   5
in the welfare measure since the start of the program. When outcomes can be measured in changes, we 
estimate the impact as the “difference in differences” (DID) in the outcome between the treatment and 
comparison group, rather than the “single difference” in outcomes between these two groups after the 
start of the program. DID estimates are known to be less subject to selection bias because they remove 
the effect of any unobserved time-invariant differences between the treatment and comparison groups.  
We also assume that for each beneficiary household and for all observable characteristics, a 
comparison group of nonbeneficiaries with similar propensity scores exists. Heckman, Ichimura, and 
Todd (1997, 1998) emphasize that the quality of the match can be improved by ensuring that matches 
are formed only where the distribution of the density of the propensity scores overlap between 
treatment and comparison observations, or where the propensity score densities have “common 
support.” Common support is improved by dropping treatment observations whose estimated 
propensity score is greater than the maximum or less than the minimum of the comparison group 
propensity scores. Similarly, comparison group observations with a propensity score below the 
minimum or above the maximum of the treatment observations are also dropped.
8 We also tested the 
“balancing properties” of the data by testing that treatment and comparison observations had the same 
distribution (mean) of propensity scores and of control variables within intervals (roughly quantiles) of 
the propensity score. All results presented below are based on specifications that passed the balancing 
tests. 
 
                                                      
8 A shortcoming of this approach is that treatment observations near these cut points face a potential comparison group 
with propensity scores that are either all lower or all higher than that of the treatment observation. To account for this, we 
modified this “min/max” approach to identifying a region of common support using the following procedure. We estimated 
the probit model for program participation and identified the lower and upper cut points in the comparison or treatment 
groups. Only comparison observations were dropped in the left of the distribution and treatment observations were dropped on 
the right. We then added back the 5 percent of comparison observations from each tail that had been dropped that was closest 
in terms of propensity score. This involved adding back comparison observations cut from the lower tail of the distribution. In 
addition, we trimmed the treatment observations from the interior of the propensity score distribution that had the lowest 
density of comparison observations. We dropped two percent of treatment observations with this trimming procedure. In this 
common support sample, the probit model was estimated again to obtain a new set of propensity scores to be used in creating 
the match.   6
4.  THE PSNP AND OFSP IN PRACTICE
9 
4.1. Targeting 
Within food insecure woredas served by the PSNP, chronically food-insecure households were 
identified using a mix of administrative guidelines and community knowledge. Chronic food security 
was defined as existing when a household faced continuous food shortages (usually three months of an 
annual food gap
10 or more) in the last three years and received food assistance. Households that had 
experienced shocks that had led to severe asset losses were also eligible. Beneficiaries reported, on 
average, larger food gaps in the period prior to the implementation of the PSNP and they were 
considerably more likely to report having food gaps that exceeded three months prior to the 
implementation of the PSNP. Beneficiaries were more likely to have reported experiencing drought 
shocks and had, on average, lower levels of nonland assets. Participants in the Public Works program 
were more likely to come from male-headed households with a married head. PSNP beneficiaries had 
larger households, on average, than nonbeneficiaries in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromiya, but not in 
SNNPR. 
4.2. Provision of Work and Timeliness of Payment 
Not all households received PSNP benefits in both years that the program functioned. From the 
detailed questions asked about participation in public works, we know which households received at 
least one day of employment in the previous 12 months (approximately June 2005-May 2006). The 
survey also asked households if they had received assistance (food or cash for work, or free food or 
cash) in the 12-24 month period prior to the survey (that is, June 2004 to May 2005). Just over 22 
percent of households that did not receive work between June 2005 and May 2006 reported receiving 
some assistance between June 2004 and May 2005. Half the households participating in public works 
between June 2005 and May 2006 had not received any assistance in the 12 months prior to that 
period. This shifting in and out of assistance programs means that the expected positive impact for 
public works participants may be less than expected because many current beneficiaries received 
benefits for only one year or less. Second, some of the households in the comparison group were food 
aid beneficiaries prior to the start of the PSNP in 2005. We might expect their food security and other 
welfare outcomes to be better than would be the case if they were “pure” controls who had not received 
any prior benefits. However, many PSNP beneficiaries had also been food aid recipients before 2005. 
We undertook several robustness checks of our results to examine whether prior access to food aid 
affected estimated program impact. A third concern is that the anticipated benefits associated with 
predictable transfer payments were lost, and this might affect the likelihood of risk-taking behavior 
such as adoption of new seeds.  
Not only are there variations in access across years, but there are considerable differences in 
the amount of days worked across regions as well. Households in Tigray worked more days than 
households elsewhere, although the differences in days worked between Tigray, Amhara, and SNNPR 
in the period January-June 2006, are relatively small. In the same period, households in Oromiya 
worked significantly fewer days than households in other regions. As a result, there are marked 
regional variations in the size of transfers made to public works households. Between January and June 
2006, Tigray households with members employed in public works received approximately 50 birr per 
month. Comparable figures for the other regions are 30 birr per month in Amhara, 39 birr per month in 
Oromiya, and 56 birr per month in SNNPR. However, proportionately these are smaller than the 
variations in days employed, reflecting significant wage arrears in both Tigray and Amhara. A study 
examining the payment process (construction of attendance sheets, payroll preparation, and so on) 
                                                      
9 Gilligan et al. (2007) provide a detailed discussion of the implementation of the PSNP and OFSP. 
10 The food gap is defined as the number of months in the last 12 months that a household reports it had difficulty 
satisfying its food needs.   7
found that, on average, 39 days elapsed between the preparation of public works’ attendance sheets and 
payment to beneficiaries. Shortages of cashiers and lack of transport were two factors that significantly 
contributed to these arrears. (Department for International Development, U.K., 2007). 
There are also regional differences in the amount of employment received. Households 
targeted for public works employment were planned to receive up to five days work per month for six 
months (at a wage of 6 birr per day or its equivalent in food) for each household member. Using our 
survey data, we calculated the ratio of the number of days of actual employment to the number of days 
of planned employment. For the period January-May 2006, mean values of this ratio range from a low 
of 0.23 in Oromiya to a high of 0.48 in Tigray. Because of wage arrears, the ratio of actual payments to 
planned payments is lower, ranging from a low of 0.11 in Amhara to 0.40 in SNNPR. If we restrict 
attention to a shorter, more recent period (March-May 2006), these ratios improve. The ratio of actual 
to planned employment is only 0.38 in Oromiya; elsewhere it is 0.71 in SNNPR, 0.73 in Amhara, and 
0.80 in Tigray. But even in this period, actual payments lag planned payments, ranging from 0.10 in 
Amhara to 0.38 in SNNPR.  
The fact that actual employment is often considerably less than planned employment, and the 
fact that there are significant wage arrears carry a number of implications, none of them beneficial to 
our assessment of impact. First, a key outcome is the number of months that a household has a food 
gap. Because these poor households are liquidity-constrained (that is, they have limited ability to 
borrow or save), their current consumption is tied fairly tightly to current income. So, even if 
households received full payment—albeit delayed—for their work, the existence of wage arrears 
makes it difficult for beneficiary households to reduce their food gap. Second, because observed 
payments
11 are much lower than were planned, the ability of the program to increase asset levels (via 
savings out of transfer income) is circumscribed. 
4.3. Links to the Other Food Security Programme 
Access to the OFSP varied significantly by region. In Tigray, 69 percent of households that had 
obtained public works employment under the PSNP also reported receiving support from at least one 
component of the OFSP, and 49 percent reported receiving access to multiple components. More than 
15 percent of these Tigrayan households reported receiving support from programs that provided 
access to improved seeds, irrigation and water-harvesting schemes, soil and water conservation, credit, 
the provision of livestock or of chicks; 27 percent received crop production extension services in the 
previous production year; and 56 percent had contact with a Development Agent (DA). Access to the 
OFSP was lower in Amhara, where 29 percent of households that  had obtained public works 
employment under the PSNP also reported receiving support from at least one component of the OFSP, 
and 14 percent reported receiving access to multiple components. Only six percent received crop 
production extension services, and 29 percent had contact with a Development Agent. Access to the 
OFSP was even lower in Oromiya and SNNPR with 12 and 20 percent of households receiving 
services, respectively. 
                                                      
11 A cautionary note to consider is that it is possible that households received payments for work undertaken in 2006 but 
received these after May 2006 (the last month for which our survey recorded payments).    8
5.  THE IMPACT OF THE PSNP AND OFSP  
5.1. Defining Program Participation 
These features of program implementation create challenges in terms of defining treatment and 
comparison group households. We used three definitions which, broadly speaking, correspond to 
increasing levels of program exposure.  
Definition 1 
A household is considered a treatment household if, in the period June 2005-May 2006, it received any 
payment for undertaking work on PSNP-supported public works.
12 We refer to these households as 
PW-PSNP beneficiaries. A household is considered a comparison group household if, in the same 
period, it was either a non-PSNP participant or, while listed as a PSNP participant, did not receive any 
payments for public works activities. Households that received Direct Support are excluded from both 
treatment and comparison groups.
13 
Definition 2 
A household is considered a treatment household if, in the period June 2005-May 2006, it 
received at least 90 birr per person, or food equivalent in value to 90 birr, for undertaking work on 
PSNP-supported public works. This treatment group represents those households that received at least 
half of the amount of transfers it should have received according to the design of the program.
14 A 
household is considered a comparison group household if, in the same period, it was not a PSNP 
participant; that is, it did not supply any work or receive any payments for public works activities. 
Households that received Direct Support are excluded from both treatment and comparison groups.  
Definition 3 
A household is considered a treatment household if, in the period June 2005-May 2006, it 
received any payment for undertaking work on PSNP-supported public works and, during this period, 
it received access to any component of the OFSP (such as access to improved seeds, irrigation and 
water-harvesting schemes, soil and water conservation, credit, the provision of livestock or of chicks, 
crop production extension services, or had contact with a Development Agent). We refer to these 
households as PW-PSNP-OFSP beneficiaries. A household is considered a comparison group 
household if, in the same period, it was either a non-PSNP participant or, while listed as a PSNP 
participant, did not receive any payments for public works activities and did not have access to any 
component of the OFSP. Households that received Direct Support are again excluded from both 
treatment and comparison groups. 
Households that had been previous PSNP beneficiaries or past beneficiaries of emergency food 
assistance but are not current beneficiaries are included in the comparison group. Other things equal, 
this will tend to bias downward estimates of impact. To understand why, consider two households. One 
receives 100 birr from the PSNP in 2004-2005; the second receives an identical amount in 2005-2006. 
Under both definitions, the first household is part of the comparison group while the second is included 
                                                      
12 A limitation of our study is that we cannot assess whether there were differential effects based on the form of payment, 
food or cash. The fundamental problem we face is that the distribution of recipients by form of payment is strongly affected 
by residence. For example, nearly all households in SNNPR received cash, whereas 70 per cent of Tigrayan beneficiaries 
received food. Wage arrears were much higher in Tigray than they were in SNNPR. Consequently, a “food-cash” comparison 
conflates comparisons by form of payment with other factors, making it difficult to assess the differential impact of food or 
cash. This is an unfortunate limitation given the considerable policy interest in this topic. 
13 We exclude participants receiving Direct Support for two reasons. First, because they are considerably poorer than 
nonbeneficiaries (see Gilligan et al. 2007), it is challenging to match them to nonbeneficiary households. Second, levels of 
transfers received by these households receiving Direct Support are very low. In Amhara, for example, between June and 
December 2005, monthly household transfers were 9 birr per Direct Support beneficiary household or, in dollar terms, just 
over US$1 per household per month. Such low levels of transfers are unlikely to produce measurable impact. 
14 We considered a definition under which a treatment household was one that had received all benefits it was intended to 
receive. However, there were not enough beneficiaries to estimate impact under this definition.   9
in the treatment group. Given that they received the same level of transfers, albeit in different years, it 
is not clear why the treatment group defined here will have higher levels of assets than the comparison 
group.
15 Also, it would be helpful to understand which components of the OFSP had the greatest 
impact on outcomes of interest. Unfortunately, because coverage of the OFSP was so sparse, we did 
not have a sufficiently large sample to investigate this. 
5.2. Defining Outcomes 
We considered two sets of outcomes. The first is one that the PSNP and OFSP use as indicators that 
objectives are being met. For the PSNP, one critical indicator is the “food gap” (that is; the number of 
months in the last 12 months that a household reports that it had problems satisfying its food needs), a 
measure of household food security. A second indicator concerns asset holdings, as a goal of the PSNP 
is to prevent households from reducing their already low asset base. The OFSP has the objective of 
increasing income and asset levels, asset holdings, use of credit, and use of improved agricultural 
practices such as fertilizer and improved seeds (Government of Ethiopia, 2007).
16  
The second set of outcomes provides alternative measures of the program’s outcome 
indicators. These include alternative measures of food security, such as caloric acquisition in the 
previous seven days; the magnitude of the food gap, and the number of meals children consume daily 
during the hungry season; per capita consumption, which can be thought of as a measure of the 
permanent income that flows from the household’s stock of assets; and those that reflect common 
concerns that transfer programs have displacement or disincentive effects on labor supply and on 
private transfers.   
Table 1 provides a brief summary of how these indicators were constructed. Mean values by 
treatment status are given in Tables 2, 3 and 4. 
Table 1. Summary of outcome indicators 
Type of outcome  Outcome  How measured Interpretation  of  sign 
Household food 
security 
Shortfall in caloric 
availability 
Dummy variable equalling one if daily per 
capita caloric acquisition in previous 7 days 
(see below) is less than 1,800 kcal per person 
per day. 
A negative value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits were less likely 
to be food secure.   
 Daily  per  capita 
caloric acquisition 
Respondents reported the consumption of 33 
different foods in the 7 days prior to the 
interview from purchases, stocks and amounts 
received as gifts, barter or in-kind payments. 
Quantities were converted into calories 
available for consumption and divided by 7 
(to get a daily figure) and by household size. 
A positive value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits 
acquired/consumed more calories.  
  Change in months of 
food security, 2004-
2006 
Difference between number of months 
households report having no problems 
satisfying the food needs of the household in 
the last 12 months (approximately July 2005–
June 2006) and the 12 month period two years 
prior (approximately July 2003–June 2004). 
A positive value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits were more food 
secure.   
 
                                                      
15 We experimented with the definition of treatment to account for this. For example, we amended Definition 1 so that a 
treatment household is one that received PSNP benefits in both years preceding the survey, and a control household is one that 
received PSNP benefits in neither year. While this sharpened the difference between treatment and comparison households, it 
reduces sample size and therefore less statistical power. It did not produce additional results that inform our overall 
assessment of impact. We also modified the matching specification to include indicators for prior access to food aid. This 
change in specification did not meaningfully alter the results. 
16 The OFSP also aims to increase agricultural productivity. Preliminary investigations explored outcomes in this area 
too, but because the program yielded few significant impacts in this area, we have not reported on it here.   10
Table 1. Continued 




    
  Change in the square 
of the food gap, 
2004-2006 
Difference in the squared change in food gap 
(defined as the number of months that 
households had difficulty satisfying their food 
needs) between 2005-2006 and 2003-2004. 
A negative value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits were more food 
secure. A negative value indicates a 
reduction in the food gap and an 
improvement in household food security.   




The number of meals per day that children eat 
during the month when food shortages are most 
acute. 
A positive value indicates that children in 
households receiving program benefits ate 
more meals per day at the height of the hungry 
season.   
Consumption  Per capita 
consumption 
Sum of per capita value of food and nonfood 
expenditures. Food expenditures are based on 
reports of he consumption of 33 different foods 
in the 7 days prior to the interview from 
purchases, stocks and amounts received as gifts, 
barter or in-kind payments. These quantities 
were converted to values (Ethiopian birr) using 
household self-reports of purchases as well as 
food prices reported in the community 
questionnaire. Nonfood expenditures include 
purchases of 30 nonfood items, including 
clothing, kitchen equipment, furniture, 
transport, ceremonies, contributions and 
donations, fuel, lighting, soap, and tobacco. 
A positive value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits had higher levels 
of consumption of all goods (food and 
nonfood). 
  
Credit use  Any credit use  Dummy variable equalling one if household 
reported taking out a loan of at least 20 birr in 
the 12 months prior to the survey. 
A positive value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits were more likely 
to take out a loan in the last 12 months.   
 Problems  repaying 
any loan 
Dummy variable equalling one if household 
reported it had difficulty, is currently having 
difficulty, or expects to have difficulty repaying 
a loan taken out of 20 birr or more in the 12 
months prior to the survey. 
A negative value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits were less likely to 
have difficulties repaying loans.   
Use of improved 
agricultural 
technologies 
Use of fertilizer  Dummy variable equalling one if the household 
reported using any fertilizer between June 2005 
and the date of interview. 
A positive value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits were more likely 
to use fertilizer.   
  Use of improved 
seed 
Dummy variable equalling one if the household 
reported using improved seed between June 
2005 and the date of interview. 
A positive value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits were more likely 
to use improved seeds.   
Own business 
activity 
Any nonfarm own 
business activity in 
past 12 months 
Dummy variable equalling one if at least one 
household member had undertaken an off-farm 
business activity such as weaving, other 
handicrafts, trade, the collection and sale of 
firewood or dung cakes, or the manufacture and 
sale of processed foods in the 12 months prior 
to the survey. 
A positive value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits were more likely 
to participate in an off-farm business activity.  
  Entry into nonfarm 
own business in 
past 2 years 
Dummy variable equalling one if a household 
member started a nonfarm own business 
activity in the last two years. 
A positive value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits were more likely 
to start an off-farm business at some point in 
the last 2 years.   
Assets  Change in log 
value of livestock 
and tools, 
2004-2006 
Difference in the log values of livestock and 
agricultural tools owned by the household in 
2004 and 2006. 
A positive value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits increased their 






males in past 12 
months 
Dummy variable equalling one if at least one 
male household member undertook wage 
employment in the 12 months prior to the 
survey. 
A positive value indicates that in households 
receiving program benefits, men were more 
likely to undertake wage work.   11






females in past 12 
months 
Dummy variable equalling one if at least one 
female household member undertook wage 
employment in the 12 months prior to the 
survey. 
A positive value indicates that in households 
receiving program benefits, women were 
more likely to undertake wage work. 
  Entry by males into 
wage employment 
in past 2 years 
Dummy variable equalling one if a male 
household member entered wage employment 
in the last two years. 
A positive value indicates that males in 
households receiving program benefits were 
more likely to enter the wage labor market at 
some point in the last 2 years. 
 Entry  by  females 
into wage 
employment in past 
2 years 
Dummy variable equalling one if a female 
household member entered wage employment 
in the last two years. 
A positive value indicates that females in 
households receiving program benefits were 
more likely to enter the wage labor market in 
the last 2 years. 
  Any positive net 
transfers received 
from others 
Dummy variable equalling one if net transfers 
to the household in the last 12 months (transfers 
received minus transfers made) were greater 
than zero. 
A negative value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits were less likely to 
be net beneficiaries of private transfers.  
Transfers and 
remittances 
Value of net 
transfers received 
from others 
Value of net transfers received from other 
households (transfers in cash and in- kind 
received minus transfers in cash and in-kind 
made). 
A negative value indicates that households 
receiving program benefits received lower net 
private transfers.   
5.3. Assessment of Impact Using Access to the PSNP as Treatment 
Following the discussion of Definition 1, treatment households are those that received any payment for 
undertaking work on PSNP-supported public works. We estimate impact by region and for all 
observations aggregated. Because we consider 19 different outcomes, we have nearly 100 impact 
estimates. Given this number, rather than comment on each impact in each region, we focus on the full 
sample results found in Table 2. An appendix to this paper (available from the authors on request) 
provides results separately by region. 
Given the objectives of the PSNP, we are particularly interested in the outcome indicators for 
household food security. Strikingly, under this definition of treatment, there is no evidence that the 
PSNP improves food security for beneficiaries relative to the comparison group. Table 2 also shows 
that asset levels of these beneficiaries did not fall, which was a major objective of the program. 
Between 2004 and 2006, the nominal value of beneficiaries’ assets, livestock and tools increased by 
just under 45 per cent. Nevertheless, while treatment households experienced positive growth in their 
asset holdings (and this was true in all four regions), comparison group households experienced even 
faster asset growth, thus resulting in a negative program impact. Credit use by PSNP beneficiaries 
increased, a result driven largely by increased demand for consumption credit. When the results were 
disaggregated by region, we see that this finding is driven largely by results from Amhara. This is an 
unwelcome development. Given the delays in payments for public works in Amhara, this result is 
consistent with PW-PSNP beneficiary households taking out loans (possibly backed by future 
payments from public works employment) to finance current consumption. Access to the public works 
component of the PSNP increased the likelihood that households undertook their own business 
activities, but slightly reduced the likelihood that males entered the wage labor market.    12
Table 2. Average impact of any receipt of public works transfers  
  Mean 
Impact    Public works  Non-public works 
Household food security     
Caloric acquisition is less than 1,800 kcal/day/capita in last 7 days 
0.294 0.311  -0.017 
(0.448) 
Daily per capita caloric acquisition in last 7 days 
2,485 2,431 54.24 
(0.669) 
Change in months of food security, 2004-2006 
0.228 0.063 0.164 
(1.414) 
Change in the square of the food gap, 2004-2006 
-1.378 0.025 -1.403 
(1.118) 
 
Number of children’s meals/day, hungry season 
2.667 2.698  -0.031 
(0.718) 
Consumption      
Per capita total expenditure  79.76  83.02  -3.264 
(1.558) 
Credit use     
Any credit use  0.367  0.296  0.071*** 
(2.872) 
Problem repaying any loan  0.113  0.098  0.015 
(0.843) 
Use of improved agricultural technologies     
Use of fertilizer  0.186  0.187  -0.001 
(0.066) 
Use of improved seeds  0.048  0.037  0.011 
(1.117) 
Own business activity     
Any nonfarm own business activity in past 12 months  0.241  0.189  0.052*** 
(2.872) 
Entry into nonfarm own business in past 2 years  0.075  0.060  0.015 
(1.191) 
Assets     
Change in log value of livestock and tools, 2004-06  0.448  0.673  -0.225*** 
(2.776) 
Labor market participation     
Any wage employment by males in past 12 months  0.249  0.251  -0.003 
(0.124) 
Any wage employment by females in past 12 months  0.079  0.079  -0.001 
(0.042) 
Entry by males into wage employment in past 2 years  0.058  0.088  -0.030** 
(2.106) 
Entry by females into wage employment in past 2 years  0.019  0.024  -0.006 
(0.913) 
Transfers and remittances     
   Any positive net transfers received from others  0.107  0.097  0.009 
(0.724) 
   Value of net transfers received from others  5.139  -5.194  10.33 
(0.766) 
Note: Estimates for daily caloric acquisition per capita and caloric acquisition of at least 1,800 kcal/day/capita are based on a 
trimmed sample of households with daily caloric acquisition per capita of at least 1,200 kcal and not more than 4,800 kcal. 
Estimates for per capita food expenditure and per capita total expenditure are based on samples in which the top 5 percent and 
bottom 5 percent of the expenditure distribution were removed for each variable in order to reduce the effect of severe 
outliers. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses is based on bootstrapped standard errors. * significant at the 10 percent 
level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level. Sample sizes: nB = 1,234, nNB = 524.    13
5.4. Assessment of Impact Using the 90 Birr per Household Member Definition of 
Household Participation in the PSNP 
Under Definition 2, treatment households are those that received payments of at least 90 birr per person 
for work on PSNP-supported public works in the period June 2005-May 2006. Results are reported in 
Table 3. Using this definition, we find that one measure of household food security—the likelihood 
that a household has very low caloric intake—improves (in the full sample). There was also an increase 
in per capita caloric acquisition. This increase is not statistically significant for the full sample, but is 
significant in Tigray, the area for which the region-specific sample was largest. As with Definition 1, 
there is increased likelihood of nonfarm business activities and reduced entry into the wage labor 
market. The increase in nonfarm activities may reflect increased household liquidity, and payments 
under the PSNP may be financing start-up costs associated with these enterprises. This increased 
liquidity may also explain why problems with loan repayment have been reduced. While there is a 
significant reduction in the likelihood of entry into wage employment, the interpretation of this result 
should be done cautiously. This result may reflect a disincentive effect; that is, PSNP beneficiaries 
were less likely to enter wage employment because they were receiving transfers. Alternatively, access 
to the PSNP may have been displacing entry into wage employment, with beneficiaries opting to work 
for the PSNP instead. Regional disaggregations show that males in Tigrayan households were 
particularly less likely to enter the wage labor market, and Tigray is the region where males worked the 
most number of days. This observation is consistent with the displacement argument. It raises the 
concern that Public Works activities are crowding out labor supply to private labor markets, which 
could produce upward pressure on wages. In order to have a clear assessment of whether the PSNP is 
having a disincentive effect on labor supply, we would need to know the total number of hours worked 
by households in our sample. Unfortunately, such data are not available. 
Table 3. Average impact of public works transfers of at least 90 birr per household member  
  Full sample 
  Mean 
Impact    Public works  Non-public works 
Household food security      
Caloric acquisition is less than 1,800 kcal/day/capita in last 7 days 0.277  0.381  -0.112** 
(2.036) 
Daily per capita caloric acquisition in last 7 days  2551  2368  183.4 
(1.568) 
Change in months of food security, 2004-06  0.410  0.252  0.158 
(0.833) 
Change in the square of the food gap, 2004-06  5.697  3.629  2.067 
(0.647) 
Number of children’s meals/day in hungry season  2.739  2.785  -0.046 
(0.609) 
Consumption       
Per capita total expenditure  89.55  94.49  -4.94 
(1.182) 
Credit use      
Any credit use  0.351  0.363  -0.012 
(0.290) 
Problem repaying any loan  0.093  0.161  -0.068** 
(2.005) 
Use of improved agricultural technologies      
Use of fertilizer  0.188  0.201  -0.014 
(0.437) 
Use of improved seeds  0.039  0.078  -0.039 
(1.490) 
   14
Table 3. Continued 
  Full sample 
  Mean 
Impact    Public works  Non-public works 
Own business activity      
Any nonfarm own business activity in past 12 months  0.241  0.171  0.065** 
(2.122) 
Entry into nonfarm own business in past 2 years  0.070  0.884  -0.018 
(0.628) 
Assets      
Change in log value of livestock and tools, 2004-06  0.478  0.662  -0.185 
(1.570) 
Labor market participation      
Any wage employment by males in past 12 months  0.228  0.257  -0.029 
(0.770) 
Any wage employment by females in past 12 months  0.168  0.221  -0.053 
(0.549) 
Entry by males into wage employment in past 2 years  0.035  0.145  -0.110*** 
(3.00) 
Entry by females into wage employment in past 2 years  0.020  0.018  0.002 
(0.175) 
Transfers and remittances      
Any positive net transfers received from others  0.087  0.090  -0.003 
(0.120) 
Value of net transfers received from others  -3.50  -28.44  24.93 
(0.975) 
Note: See Table 2. Sample sizes in matched samples for PW beneficiaries and PW nonbeneficiaries are 485 and 234, 
respectively. 
5.5. Assessment of Impact Using Access to the PSNP and OFSP as Treatment 
Under Definition 3, households were considered beneficiaries if they received any payment for 
undertaking work on PSNP-supported public works and they received access to at least one 
intervention or service provided under the OFSP.  
The striking feature of the results reported in Table 4 is the relatively large number (7 out of 
19) of statistically significant impacts at the 5 percent level; with an eighth significant at the 10 percent 
level. Relative to the comparison group, PW-PSNP-OFSP beneficiaries are more likely to be food 
secure, to borrow for productive purposes, and to use improved agricultural technologies. There is no 
evidence that PW-PSNP-OFSP participation reduces labor supply to the wage labor market by either 
men or women, or crowds out private transfers. 
Table 4 shows no difference between treatment and comparison group households in the 
prevalence of current household food security, as measured by whether the household had available for 
consumption 1,800 kilocalories per person per day. However, mean caloric availability is higher by 
nearly 10 percent in PW-PSNP-OFSP beneficiary households compared to the comparison group.
17 
When we disaggregate by region, we find that while this positive impact is most marked in Tigray, it is 
also observed in Amhara and SNNPR. In terms of the food gap, a key outcome measure for the FSP, 
the PW-PSNP-OFSP has a sizeable (1.6 months) positive impact on this measure of food security in 
Tigray. Across all sampled households, food security improved by 0.36 months among PW-PSNP-
OFSP beneficiary households when compared to the comparison group, and this impact is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. Further, the severity of the food gap is reduced as shown by the 
negative and statistically significant impact on the change in the square of the food gap.
18  
                                                      
17 As a specification check, we also estimated impact after transforming this variable to logs. Doing so did not 
qualitatively change these findings. 
18 We considered four other coping strategies. We found no impact on meal frequency by adults during the hungry   15
Table 4. Average joint impact of Public Works (PW) and OFSP transfers  
  Full sample 
  Mean 
Impact    Public works  Non-public works 
Household food security      
Caloric acquisition is less than 1,800 kcal/day/capita in last 7 days  0.271 0.321  -0.050 
(1.023) 
Daily per capita caloric acquisition in last 7 days  2577 2347 230.0*** 
(2.608) 
Change in months of food security, 2004-06  0.361 -0.008  0.369** 
(2.351) 
Change in the square of the food gap, 2004-06  -2.918 0.317  -3.325** 
(2.457) 
Number of children’s meals/day, hungry season 
2.738 2.695  0.044 
(0.556) 
Household consumption expenditure      
Per capita total expenditure  88.16  86.33  1.826 
(0.619) 
Credit use      
Any credit use  0.401  0.279  0.123** 
(2.512) 
Problem repaying any loan  0.137  0.062  0.075*** 
(3.202) 
Use of improved agricultural technologies      
Use of fertilizer  0.267  0.160  0.107*** 
(3.021) 
Use of improved seeds  0.082  0.033  0.048** 
(2.298) 
Own business activity      
Any nonfarm own business activity in page 12 months  0.252  0.186  0.067* 
(1.754) 
Entry into nonfarm own business in past 2 years  0.070  0.052  0.025 
(1.152) 
Assets      
Change in log value of livestock and tools, 2004-2006  0.466  0.523  -0.057 
(0.427) 
Labor market participation      
Any wage employment by males in past 12 months  0.296  0.252  0.043 
(1.124) 
Any wage employment by females in past 12 months  0.089  0.076  0.013 
(0.587) 
Entry by males into wage employment in past 2 years  0.082  0.076  0.006 
(0.246) 
Entry by females into wage employment in past 2 years  0.024  0.015  0.009 
(0.883) 
Transfers and remittances      
Any positive net transfers received from others  0.099  0.108  -0.009 
(0.352) 
Value of net transfers received from others  10.35  -4.422  14.77 
(0.888) 
Note: See Table 2. Sample sizes in matched samples for PW beneficiaries and PW nonbeneficiaries are 416 and 223, 
respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
season nor on consumption of less preferred foods or consumption of wild foods. Puzzlingly, there was a slight increase in the 
consumption of saved seeds. We are unsure how to interpret this result, given the absence of impacts on other coping 
strategies. It is possible that PW-PSNP-OFSP beneficiaries are able to save more seeds relative to households in the 
comparison group, and thus they can consume more of these seeds during periods of stress.   16
One of the objectives of the OFSP is to increase households’ use of credit. Achieving this goal 
requires actions on both the demand and supply side of the credit market; that is, households must be 
willing to borrow and there must be availability of funds that can be borrowed. Table 4 shows that 
credit use by PW-PSNP-OFSP beneficiaries was 12 percentage points higher than the comparison 
group, an increase driven entirely by the increase in demand for credit for production purposes.
19 Given 
that production credit was made available under the OFSP, this result is not entirely surprising. 
However, there was an increase in the likelihood that households borrowing for production purposes 
reported that they had, or anticipated having, difficulties in repaying these loans. Fear of difficulty in 
repaying loans was cited as the reason they did not borrow money during the previous 12 months by 36 
percent and 44 percent of households in Tigray and Amhara, respectively. Particularly in Tigray and 
Amhara, many of the loans taken by households appear to have been relatively large (the median loan 
size for all surveyed households that borrowed money is 500 and 429 birr, respectively) and it may be 
that these relatively large loans were proving to be challenging to repay. 
There was a strikingly large increase in the use of fertilizer, of nearly 10.7 percentage points, 
by PW-PSNP-OFSP beneficiaries. This represents a sharp increase relative to the comparison group, 
where only 16 percent of households used fertilizer. Moreover, there were broadly similar point 
estimates of impact found in all regions. There was an increase of 4.8 percentage points in the use of 
improved seeds, albeit from a very low base and this, too, was found across all regions.
20 
PW-PSNP-OFSP does not appear to crowd out nonfarm own business activities; in fact, 
relative to comparison group households,  beneficiaries of these programs are 6.7 percentage points 
more likely to operate these enterprises. There is likewise no evidence to suggest that PW-PSNP-OFSP 
crowds out private transfers, or that it reduces participation in wage employment.  
Finally, we considered whether PW-PSNP-OFSP beneficiaries experience more rapid asset 
growth than comparison group households. While participants in these programs do experience asset 
growth, they do so at a slower rate than comparable comparison group households, suggesting that by 
itself the PSNP and OFSP programs are not raising the rate of asset accumulation. As a check on the 
robustness of these findings, we examined other forms of asset accumulation—such as improvements 
in housing stock—but do not find any evidence of program impact.  
An important question is whether the larger impacts for households that received PW and 
OFSP (as opposed to just PW) are due entirely to the incremental effect of OFSP or to greater 
involvement in PW as well. We examined whether PW beneficiaries that also received OFSP worked 
more days or received higher transfers than PW beneficiaries on average. In the full sample, PW 
beneficiaries who also received OFSP worked an average of 7 more days in PW per household member 
during the past 12 months. Also, PW beneficiary households that also received OFSP earned an 
average of 20 birr more per household member from PW in the past 12 months than the full sample of 
PW beneficiaries.  
These results suggest that the greater impacts found for joint PW-OFSP participation were due 
in part to higher transfers from PW for households in this sample.
21 However, given the relative 
difference in the size of impacts for PW-OFSP beneficiaries compared to PW beneficiaries, it is 
unlikely that most of this effect was due to a difference in PW receipts of only 20 birr (which amounts 
                                                      
19 We also estimated the impact of access to PW-PSNP-OFSP on the size of these loans. Relative to comparison 
households, beneficiaries took out larger loans for production purposes; there was no difference in the size of consumption 
loans. 
20 We assessed impact of the programs on use of pesticides but found no evidence that access to the PW-PSNP-OFSP 
increased their usage.  
21 It could be argued that differences in the samples used to construct the impact estimates for PW-PSNP and those for 
joint receipt of PW-PSNP and OFSP may be contributing to the differences in observed impacts. However, in the matched 
samples that satisfied all requirements to be included in the impact estimates, there were 1,758 household observations for the 
PW-PSNP impact analysis, and 639 household observations for estimating the joint impact of PW-PSNP and OFSP. This 
difference in sample sizes would provide greater statistical power to the sample used for the PW-PSNP analysis; thus, it is 
unlikely that differences in sample size were responsible for the stronger impacts observed for joint PW-PSNP and OFSP 
participation.   17
to a 21 percent increase in PW receipts). Also, these results reflect regional differences in both the 
coverage of OFSP and in the impact of PW and the OFSP. PW beneficiaries in Tigray were much more 
likely to receive the OFSP. Half of all joint beneficiaries—those receiving PW and the OFSP in the 
sample—came from Tigray. 
We also considered what components of the OFSP may have been responsible for the positive 
impacts of this program when provided with PW transfers. Although the evaluation design and sample 
do not permit constructing separate impact estimates for each component of the OFSP, the prevalence 
of each component among OFSP benefits received is informative. More than half of the joint 
beneficiaries received soil and water conservation (SWC) services,
22 and almost 40 percent received 
credit. Nearly one-third of the joint beneficiaries received irrigation services. Receiving improved 
seeds, and having access to pasture or livestock were also common, with 18 percent of joint 
beneficiaries claiming access in each of these categories.  
 
                                                      
22 It is worth noting that 85 percent of OFSP beneficiaries received other services, so the SWC activities indicated by 
respondents are not entirely responsible for the observed joint PW-OFSP impacts. Also, 25 percent of households who 
received SWC support from the OFSP also received extension services.   18
6.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has used Propensity Score Matching to assess the impact of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety 
Nets Programme and Other Food Security Programme after their first 18 months of operation. As noted 
in the Introduction, the PSNP is the largest social protection program in Sub-Saharan Africa outside of 
South Africa. Our findings are subject to three caveats:  
1.  At the time of data collection, the program had only been operational for 18 months. For 
this reason, this should be considered as an interim assessment of program impact. A 
survey conducted in 2008 will give insights into longer-run effects of the program.  
2.  Despite the substantial strengths of this data set, one weakness is that the data were 
collected more than one year after the program began, so the set of pre-PSNP household 
and community characteristics used to match beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries had to be 
collected through recall. 
3.  Deviations between planned and actual program implementation downwardly bias 
estimates of impact.  
We note that an assessment of these programs depends critically on how participation is 
defined. Our matching estimates find little evidence of program impact when participation is defined in 
terms of receiving any payment for undertaking work on PSNP-supported public works. However, we 
found no evidence that asset levels shrank, which was a key objective of the PSNP program. Somewhat 
stronger evidence of impact emerges when we define participation in terms of households receiving at 
least half of their intended transfers; here, one measure of household food security (caloric acquisition 
above a minimum threshold) was improved. A more positive picture emerges when participation in 
both the PSNP and OFSP is considered. Relative to the comparison group, participants are more likely 
to be food secure, and are more likely to borrow for productive purposes, use improved agricultural 
technologies, and operate nonfarm own business activities. For these households, there was no 
evidence of disincentive effects in terms of the reduced supply of labor to wage employment or private 
transfers. Although asset levels grew, relative to the comparison group, beneficiaries did not 
experience faster asset growth. It remains to be seen whether continued participation in the PSNP and 
OFSP will result in future growth in assets.   19
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